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Syllabus by the Ohio Ethics Commission:
* * * * * * Your request for an advisory opinion asks whether a former deputy administrator of the Bureau of Employment Services can represent a client before the Bureau of Employment Services, the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review or the courts on an unemployment compensation matter. You state by way of history, that you served as deputy administrator of the Bureau of Employment Services from December 20, 1971 through January 10, 1975, and that as deputy administrator you were responsible for the overall supervision of the Unemployment Compensation Division of the Bureau. You state you are presently engaged in the practice of law and ask if you are prohibited by Section 102.03 (A) of the Revised Code from representing clients 1) before the Administrator of the Bureau of Employment Services, 2) before the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, and 3) in cases appealed from the Board of Review to the courts. Section 102.03 (A) of the Revised Code states:
Section 102.03 (A) of the Revised Code restricts the representation of clients before only the public agency with which the employee or official was employed or served. A deputy administrator of the Bureau of Employment Services is an employee of the Bureau. However, the issue with regard to representation of clients before the Board of Review turns on whether the Board is part of the public agency with which the deputy administrator was employed or served. The Board of Review is established by Section 4141.06 of the Revised Code which states:
Thus, the Board of Review may appoint a Secretary to the Board, appoint referees, hire employees, prepare and submit a budget, and control such other administrative functions as necessary to hear appeals arising from claims for unemployment compensation. These functions indicate autonomy and establish the Board as a separate, distinct public agency from the Bureau of Employment Services. The courts are a separate public agency, independent and distinct from the General Assembly, departments, division, institutions, instrumentalities, boards, commissions or bureaus of the state, counties or municipalities. The distinct nature of the courts is indicated in Section 102.01 of the Revised Code, the definition of "public agency," which specifically includes the courts as a separate, distinct public entity. Thus, the prohibitions of Section 102.03 (A) of the Revised Code apply to the former deputy administrator only with respect to the representation of clients before the Bureau and not the Board of Review or the courts since he was an employee only of the Bureau. He was not employed by either the Board of Review or the courts and thus the prohibitions do not apply to his representation before these agencies. Section 102.03 (A) of the Revised Code prohibits only the representation of clients in certain matters. The interpretation of the word "matter" is subject to limitations by an exception included within Section 102.03 (A) of the Revised Code:
This sentence is clearly an exception to the application of the section. The general rule of construction is that an exception in a statute is an affirmation of the application of its provisions to all cases not excepted, and excludes all other exceptions. This well established theory of construction was restated in Hill v. Harris et al, 39 Ohio Op. 267 (1948), at page 271:
Thus, representing a client before the administrator of the Bureau of Employment Services is not the kind of activity contemplated by the exclusionary language of Section 102.03 (A) of the Revised Code and is, therefore, the representation of a client on a "matter" as used in Section 102.03 (A) of the Revised Code. An additional condition of Section 102.03 (A) of the Revised Code is that the state employee or official must have been "directly concerned with" and personally participated" by a "substantial and material exercise of administrative discretion" in the matter as those terms are used in Section 102.03 (A) of the Revised Code:
The phrases, emphasized above, are crucial in establishing the intention of the section and test the proximity of a person to a "matter." The phrases "directly concerned," "personally participate" and "substantial and material exercise of administrative discretion" are not terms of art in legal parlance. Some of the terms within these phrases may individually be technical, such as "material," however, the phrases as a whole are not. The Revised Code offers no watershed of usage of the phrases through which comparisons can be drawn or precedents discerned. Consider the use of the term "discretion" as illustrated in the analogous area of "abuse of discretion" at 3 0. Jur. 2d, Appellate Review, Section 746, which states "it is difficult to define exactly what is meant by 'abuse of discretion,' and practically impossible to lay down any general rule as to what it consists of, since it depends upon the facts in each particular case." It is reasonable to conclude that a similar statement would apply to the phrase "substantial and material use of administrative discretion," or for that matter the phrases "personally participate" and "directly concerned" as they are used in Division (A) of Section 102.03 of the Revised Code. None of these terms have developed a precise, technical definition through their use in the law. Therefore, Section 1.42 of the Revised Code requires a "common usage" interpretation:
Thus, the following general common usage definitions of the terms are offered:
The Ohio Ethics Commission must examine each case on its facts, applying Section 102.03 (A) of the Revised Code and the common usage definitions of the terms therein. It must determine in the case at hand whether a person is representing a client before the state agency by which he was employed or served, within the preceding twelve months, on a matter with which he was directly concerned and in which he personally participated during his employment or service by a substantial and material exercise of administrative discretion. Therefore, it is the opinion of the Ohio Ethics Commission, and you are so advised that a former deputy administrator of the Bureau of Employment Services is prohibited for twelve months after leaving the Bureau, from representing a client on a matter before the Bureau, if while serving as deputy administrator of the Bureau, he was directly concerned and personally participated by a substantial and material exercise of administrative discretion with regard to the matter. A former deputy administrator of the Bureau of Employment Services is not prohibited from representing a client on a matter before the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review or the courts. OHIO ETHICS COMMISSION |
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